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Nino & Sonia:  
The Dark Horse Heroes of Criminal Justice on the 
Roberts Court 
Shahrzad Daneshvar* & Brooke Clason Smith** 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the founding of the United States, Presidents have chosen 
Supreme Court nominees who share similar ideological values, and 
nearly 90% of Supreme Court nominations have gone to members of 
the President’s own political party.1 With a few exceptions,2 
Presidents have generally been successful in achieving their 
ideological goals with their appointments.3 Although the degree to 
which ideology affects judicial decision-making remains contested, 
the notion that Justices’ ideologies influence their behavior on the 
Supreme Court is nothing new.4  
 
 *  Law Clerk to the Honorable Darrin P. Gayles, U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of Florida. J.D. 2016, The University of Chicago Law School; M.S. University of 
Miami; B.A. 2008, The George Washington University.   
 **  Litigation Associate, Schiff Hardin LLP, Chicago, Ill. J.D. 2016, The University of 
Chicago Law School; B.S. 2013, Brigham Young University.  
We are grateful to Lee Epstein, Dennis J. Hutchinson, Adam Liptak, Judge Richard A. 
Posner, and the students in the University of Chicago Law School’s course on the judicial 
behavior of the Roberts Court for their insightful comments and suggestions. We are especially 
grateful to Professor Epstein for her guidance on this Article. We also thank the editors and 
staff of the Washington University Journal of Law & Policy for their input during the editing 
process.  
 1  LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF 
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 26, 60 (2005). 
 2  For example, when President George H.W. Bush nominated Justice David Souter to 
the Supreme Court, he did not expect that he would join the Court’s liberal wing. See id. at 130. 
 3  Id. at 132. 
 4  See, e.g., C. Herman Pritchett, Divisions of Opinion among Justices of the Supreme 
Court, 1939-1941, 35 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 890, 890 (1941) (finding that Supreme Court Justices 
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This Article examines the voting record of the Roberts Court 
Justices in criminal procedure cases to determine whether the Justices 
vote consistent with their ideologies in these cases. Specifically, we 
test the conventional judicial-behavior narrative, which predicts that 
ideologically liberal appointees will be sympathetic to criminal 
defendants, while ideologically conservative appointees will be 
relatively unsympathetic.5 
II. METHODOLOGY 
We obtained our data from the Supreme Court Database6 and 
included only criminal procedure cases. Because we are primarily 
concerned with voting trends of current members of the Roberts 
Court, we begin our analysis with the 2009 term,7 when Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor joined the Court, and end with the 2014 term. 
To determine whether Justices’ votes reflect their ideological 
leanings on criminal justice issues, we used the 2014 Martin-Quinn 
scores.8 This is a time-tested measure of judicial ideology that is 
based on the votes of the Justices in all non-unanimous cases.9 For 
Justice Anthony Kennedy, we supplemented our proxy with President 
Ronald Reagan’s political affiliation (Republican) because his 
 
“are influenced by biases and philosophies of government . . . , which to a large degree 
predetermine the position they will take on a given question. Private attitudes, in other words, 
become public law.”). 
 5  See CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF 
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 5 (2006). 
 6  MODERN Database: 2016 Release 01, SUPREME COURT DATABASE, 
http://supremecourtdatabase.org/data.php (last visited Jan. 25, 2017). 
 7  Our data set excludes Justice John Paul Stevens—who served on the Court during the 
2009 term.  
 8  See Measures, MARTIN-QUINN SCORES, http://mqscores.berkeley.edu/measures.php 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2017). Using Martin-Quinn Scores, with lower scores indicating more 
liberal voting record, and zero as the cutoff between liberal and conservative, for the 2014 term, 
the Justices scored as follows: Ginsburg: -2.461, Sotomayor: -2.354, Kagan: -1.913, Breyer: -
1.729, Kennedy: -.15, Roberts: .869, Scalia: 1.583, Alito: 2.037, Thomas: 3.24. 
 9  See id. Because the Martin-Quinn scores are based on votes, we could be accused of 
using votes to predict votes. But see generally Andrew D. Martin & Kevin Quinn, Can Ideal 
Point Estimates Be Used as Explanatory Variables (Oct. 8, 2005) (working paper, 2005), 
http://mqscores.berkeley.edu/media/resnote.pdf. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/8
Document7  12/22/2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017]  Nino & Sonia: Dark Horse Heroes 21 
 
 
Martin-Quinn scores are indeterminate.10 For each vote in each case 
of our data set, we coded whether the Justice voted consistent with 
their ideology11 or inconsistent with their ideology.12 
Because we aimed to isolate the prevalence of ideological voting, 
we opted to remove all unanimous decisions from our dataset. There 
are a number of factors that may affect unanimous decisions, making 
them less reflective of ideological voting than other decisions.13 For 
example, according to Eric Posner, unanimous decisions may result 
from the Court’s attempt to mask ideological disagreement and 
enhance the Court’s image.14 On his account, at least some are a 
product of in-chambers compromises that do not actually reflect the 
Justices’ opinions on the specific case.15 Some unanimous cases also 
contain concurrences that read more like dissents, which further 
complicates the ideological meaning that we can ascribe to individual 
votes in unanimous cases.16  
In some cases, the Court considered multiple issues, which the 
data captured as multiple Justice votes. In these cases, the Justices 
made separate determinations for each issue.17 We included these 
 
 10  In all but the 2014 term, Justice Kennedy’s Martin-Quinn Score has ranked as 
“weakly conservative,” but during the 2014 term, he ranked as “weakly liberal.” Taking his 
presidential appointment as well as all years prior to 2014 into account, we coded Justice 
Kennedy as “conservative.” Measures, supra note 8.  
 11  A liberal Justice voting liberally or a conservative Justice voting conservatively. 
 12  A liberal Justice voting conservatively or a conservative Justice voting liberally. 
 13  See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND 
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 124–37 (2013). 
 14  Eric Posner, The Supreme Court Breakfast Table: Why Does the Court Usually 
Decide Cases 9-0 or 5-4?, SLATE (July 1, 2014, 11:07 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/2014/scotus_roun 
dup/supreme_court_2014_why_are_most_cases_either_9_0_or_5_4.html. But see Robert 
Barnes, For These Supreme Court Justices, Unanimous Doesn’t Mean Unity, WASH. POST (July 
1, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/for-these-supreme-court-
justices-unanimous-doesnt-mean-unity/2014/07/01/94003590-0132-11e4-b8ff-
89afd3fad6bd_story.html (noting a University of Chicago professor and former Roberts clerk’s 
skepticism about the Court’s concern for its appearance). 
 15  See Posner, supra note 14. 
 16  See, e.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2548 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“I prefer not to take part in the assembling of an apparent but specious unanimity.”). 
 17  See, e.g., Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 368 (2010) (finding that the 
defendant had received a fair trial, a conservative holding, but limiting the honest services 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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distinct votes as separate ideological votes in our data set. 
III. RESULTS 
Table 1 displays our results. The consistency variable ranged from 
89% consistent for Justice Samuel Alito (with Justice Sotomayor 
close behind at 87% consistent) to 52% consistent for Justice 
Kennedy. On average, the conservative Justices were 71% consistent, 
and the liberal Justices were 79.5% consistent. Removing Justice 
Kennedy from the calculation (his results show his true nature as a 
“swing” vote) brings the conservative Justices to 76% consistent. 
TABLE 1. CONSISTENCY RESULTS 
 Percentage 
Consistent 
Percentage 
Inconsistent 
Alito 89% 11% 
Sotomayor 87% 13% 
Thomas 84% 16% 
Ginsburg 82% 18% 
Kagan 78% 22% 
Breyer 71% 29% 
Roberts 66% 34% 
Scalia 65% 35% 
Kennedy 52% 48% 
 
We observed a few changes in the lineup of Justice ideology. 
Among the liberal Justices, we found Justice Sotomayor to vote more 
consistently liberal that Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, despite Justice 
Ginsburg’s ranking as the most liberal Justice on the Court during the 
period under analysis. Among the conservative Justices, we found 
Justice Alito to vote more consistently conservative than Justice 
Clarence Thomas, despite Justice Thomas’s reputation as the most 
conservative Justice on the Court. Leaving aside Justice Kennedy, we 
also found Justice Antonin Scalia to vote the least consistently of the 
 
statute to bribery and kickback schemes, a liberal holding). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/8
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conservative Justices (or any of the Justices, for that matter)—less 
than Chief Justice John Roberts and far less than Justices Alito and 
Thomas. These observed changes are reflected in Table 2 below, 
comparing the ideological ordering on the Court in general to the 
ideological ordering in our results. 
TABLE 2.  COMPARISON OF JUSTICE IDEOLOGY FROM MOST TO 
LEAST LIBERAL 
Martin-Quinn Ideological 
Ordering 
Ordering in Our Criminal 
Cases 
Ginsburg Sotomayor 
Sotomayor Ginsburg 
Kagan Kagan 
Breyer Breyer 
Kennedy Kennedy 
Roberts Scalia 
Scalia Roberts 
Alito Thomas 
Thomas Alito 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Our results indicate that Justices Scalia and Sotomayor both vote 
more liberally than expected based on their aggregate voting 
patterns.18 Both also defied pre-nomination predictions in criminal 
procedure cases. We have identified prominent trends in cases from 
our data set that may explain these results. 
A. JUSTICE SCALIA: A STRANGE BEDFELLOW 
In the context of criminal cases, Justice Scalia is the second-most 
inconsistent justice on the Court. Given our measures of ideology and 
Justice Scalia’s reputation as a “conservative legal giant,”19 we find 
 
 18  See supra Table 2. 
 19  Ross Douthat, Antonin Scalia, Conservative Legal Giant, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 13, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/13/opinion/antonin-scalia-conservative-legal-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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this result surprising. We observe that Justice Scalia’s perspective on 
constitutional criminal rights and procedures may have strong 
explanatory power over his liberal votes in criminal cases. Of his 
twenty-seven liberal votes, six related to the Fourth Amendment20 
and four related to the Sixth Amendment.21 In these cases, he 
expressed an expansive view of the protection afforded under both 
the Fourth and Six Amendments; he focused specifically on the scope 
of searches and seizures and the confrontation clause. Further, in 
these cases, Justice Scalia often found himself in the midst of an 
unlikely coalition of Justices, given his own ideological tendencies.  
Prior to his appointment, Justice Scalia maintained a pro-
prosecution reputation.22 On the D.C. Circuit he “impressed observers 
as a strong ‘law and order’ man,”23 and was referred to as “the 
darling of tough-on-crime conservatives.”24 In fact, each of his 
criminal procedure opinions on the D.C. Circuit supported the 
prosecution.25 Only after his nomination to the Supreme Court, 
however, did Justice Scalia’s pro-defendant tendencies emerge.26 
 
giant.html. 
 20  See Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015) (Justice Scalia joined 
the majority opinion); Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2014) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013) (Justice Scalia penned the majority 
opinion); Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013) (Justice Scalia joined the opinion of the 
Court); Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Bailey v. 
United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1043 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 21  See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2264 (2012) (Justice Scalia joined Justice 
Kagan’s dissent); Southern Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012) (Justice Scalia 
joined the majority opinion); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011) (Justice Scalia 
joined the opinion of the Court); Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 379 (2011) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 22  See Joanmarie Ilaria Davoli, Justice Scalia for the Defense?, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 
687, 689 (2011). 
 23  George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297, 
1321 (1990). 
 24  Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph 
of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183, 184 (2005). 
 25  See Kannar, supra note 23, at 1321.  
 26  See, e.g., Davoli, supra note 22, at 719–20 (“Justice Scalia’s positive impact on the 
rights of criminal defendants has been largely unnoted. Justice Scalia has authored a variety of 
opinions in which the rights of the criminal defendant were upheld, even against long-accepted 
prosecutorial procedures.”); Christopher E. Smith & Madhavi McCall, Justice Scalia’s 
Influence on Criminal Justice, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 535, 554 (2003) (“[Scalia’s] interpretive and 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/8
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Some commentators attribute these trends to Scalia’s well-known 
judicial philosophy of originalism.27 We observe specific refrains of 
originalism in the cases from our data.  
In the Fourth Amendment context, Justice Scalia called on the 
Framers’ concept of a people free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.28 He identified the British use of “general warrants”—
“warrants not grounded upon a sworn oath of a specific infraction by 
a particular individual”—as a primary evil addressed by the Framers’ 
inclusion of the Fourth Amendment.29 Against this backdrop, he 
condemned the “suspicionless” DNA swabbing in Maryland v. 
King.30 Using his characteristic interpretive lens, Justice Scalia also 
clarified the original meaning of a search: “When the Government 
obtains information by physically intruding on persons, houses, 
papers, or effects, a search within the original meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment has undoubtedly occurred.”31  
Justice Scalia’s brand of originalism emerges even more clearly 
and prominently in Sixth Amendment cases. Perhaps the balancing 
tests required in most Fourth Amendment cases make it a less 
suitable area for an unencumbered application of originalism.32 In 
Crawford v. Washington, Justice Scalia stated that the Sixth 
Amendment must be interpreted with a focus on the principal evil at 
which it was directed: “use of ex parte examinations as evidence 
against the accused.”33 He lamented that the Court violated the 
Framers’ intent “by replacing categorical constitutional guarantees 
 
philosophical commitments have led him to take a stand in favor of defendants’ rights with 
respect to several specific issues.”). 
 27  Kannar, supra note 23, at 1302; Bibas, supra note 24, at 184; David R. Stras & Ryan 
W. Scott, Navigating the New Politics of Judicial Appointments, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1869, 
1881 (2008). 
 28  Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 at 1692 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 29  Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 at 1980–81 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(referring to sources such as the first Virginia Constitution, the Maryland Declaration of Rights, 
ratification debates, and Madison’s draft of the Fourth Amendment). 
 30  Id. at 1989. 
 31  Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (internal quotations omitted). 
 32  See Bibas, supra note 24, at 185. 
 33  541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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with open-ended balancing tests.”34 Referring to the judiciary’s 
abuses of confrontation rights in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, Justice Scalia asserted that “[n]ot even the least dangerous 
branch [could] be trusted to assess the reliability of uncross-examined 
testimony in politically charged trials or trials implicating threats to 
national security.”35 And in Michigan v. Bryant, he invoked the 
Framers’ imputed disapproval of the majority’s “enfeebled view of 
the right to confrontation.”36 
 Justice Scalia’s comparatively low consistency percentage37 
and his emphasis on originalism in Fourth and Sixth Amendment 
cases suggest that his interpretive theory, which happens to produce 
liberal outcomes in a surprising number of criminal procedure cases, 
overrides his political ideology in such cases.38 Notably, originalism 
also leads Justice Scalia to consistently side with the Government on 
other criminal justice issues.39 Certain constitutional criminal issues 
may be particularly well-suited to this interpretive theory, but where 
the originalist outcome is less clear, we likely expect Justice Scalia to 
fall back on conservative ideology. 
B. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: THE DEFENDANTS’ RIGHTS JUSTICE 
Our results indicate that Justice Sotomayor is the most 
ideologically liberal Justice on the Court in criminal cases.40 This is 
 
 34  Id. at 67–68. 
 35  Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 394 (2011). 
 36  Id. at 389.  
 37  See supra Table 1. 
 38  See Ward Farnsworth, Signatures of Ideology: The Case of the Supreme Court’s 
Criminal Docket, 104 MICH. L. REV. 67, 67–68 (2005) (“Some justices may have ideas about 
interpretation that happen to produce outcomes friendly to one side or another as byproducts.”). 
 39  See Smith & McCall, supra note 26, at 547; Farnsworth, supra note 38, at 71. 
 40  Since her first term on the Court, Justice Sotomayor has not been hesitant to move to 
the left of Justice Ginsburg in criminal cases and has proved herself a champion of defendants’ 
rights. See, e.g., Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 542 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting); Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1105 (2014) (Justice Sotomayor joined 
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent); Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 730 (2012) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 206 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting); Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 780 (2010) (Justice Sotomayor joined Justice 
Stevens’s dissent). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/8
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especially surprising on two fronts. First, in the aggregate, Justice 
Ginsburg is statistically the most liberal Justice.41 Second, media 
reports and studies conducted on then-Judge Sotomayor’s rulings as a 
district and appellate judge predicted that she would “rule with the 
top court’s conservatives on questions of criminal justice.”42 But 
Justice Sotomayor’s rulings in criminal cases on the Court paint a 
drastically different picture. Of the eighty-two criminal cases we 
studied, Justice Sotomayor voted liberally in seventy-one of the 
cases.  
What accounts for Justice Sotomayor’s rise as the defendant’s 
rights Justice? Perhaps, as Epstein, Landes, and Posner have 
discussed,43 Justice Sotomayor turns to her priors when she is faced 
with ambiguous areas of the law. Indeed, her repeated use of 
“commonsense”44 in her decision making indicates that she has no 
qualms with using her prior experiences to navigate the law in 
criminal procedure cases.45 But a closer look at her prior experiences 
reveals an interesting discovery. Her upbringing and professional 
experience are nearly identical to those of Justice Alito—the most 
ideologically conservative Justice on criminal cases. Justices 
Sotomayor and Alito are virtually indistinguishable on paper: they 
are almost the same age; they were both born and raised in the New 
York metropolitan area in Catholic families; they both attended 
Princeton University and Yale Law School; they both worked as 
prosecutors; and they both served as judges on federal courts of 
appeals.46 But the similarities end there.  
 
 
 41  See supra Table 2. 
 42  Jess Bravin & Nathan Koppel, Nominee’s Criminal Rulings Tilt to Right of Souter, 
WALL STREET J. (June 5, 2009, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124415867263187033. 
 43  EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 13, at 8. 
 44  See, e.g., Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013); J.B.D. v. North Carolina, 564 
U.S. 261 (2011); Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 45  See Rachel E. Barkow, Justice Sotomayor and Criminal Justice in the Real World, 
YALE L.J.F. 409, 422 (2014).  
 46  PAUL FINKELMAN, THE SUPREME COURT: CONTROVERSIES, CASES, AND 
CHARACTERS FROM JOHN JAY TO JOHN ROBERTS 1283–85 (2014). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Although they have nearly identical academic and professional 
pedigrees, Justices Sotomayor and Alito had different socioeconomic 
upbringings, which could account for how they view criminal 
defendants. Justice Sotomayor was raised in a South Bronx public 
housing project by Puerto Rican immigrants. In contrast, Justice Alito 
was raised in Trenton, New Jersey by his mother, an elementary 
school principal, and his father, an Italian immigrant and prominent 
member of the New Jersey state legislature.47 Justice Sotomayor’s 
experience as a lower-middle class Latina and Justice Alito’s 
experience as a middle class white male may account for their 
varying ideologies.48 But the Justices’ childhood upbringings, alone, 
are unlikely to account for their divergent ideologies: Justice Thomas 
had a lower class upbringing as an African American in the Jim Crow 
South,49 but he is considered the most ideologically conservative 
Justice on the Court.50  
Justices Sotomayor and Alito also had different prosecutorial 
experiences. Justice Sotomayor was “in the thick of things” in New 
York City’s district attorney’s office, whereas Justice Alito 
predominately dealt with drug and immigration cases in the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office for the District of New Jersey and so did not “see 
the day-to-day carnage in neighborhoods from murders, rapes, 
burglaries, robberies, and assault, or interact with the victims of those 
crimes” as Justice Sotomayor did.51 But this theory fails to account 
for Justice Sotomayor’s conservative rulings as a federal judge on the 
Southern District of New York and on the Second Circuit. As a 
district court judge, Justice Sotomayor handed down longer sentences 
than her colleagues,52 and as a Second Circuit judge, Justice 
 
 47  See ROY M. MERSKY & TOBE LIEBERT, 21 HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL 
AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY 
COMMITTEE 1916–2006: SAMUEL A. ALITO, JR. xv (2007); FINKELMAN, supra note 46, at 1283. 
 48  See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA DECISIONS, AND 
DEVELOPMENTS 301 (5th ed. 2012). 
 49  See CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH & JOYCE A. BAUGH, THE REAL CLARENCE THOMAS: 
CONFIRMATION VERACITY MEETS PERFORMANCE REALITY 15–16 (2000). 
 50  See supra Table 2. 
 51  Barkow, supra note 45, at 422–23. 
 52  Supreme Court Nominee Judge Sonia Sotomayor: Tough on White-Collar Crime, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/8
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Sotomayor affirmed criminal convictions 92% of the time and 
reversed convictions only 2% of the time.53 
Epstein, Landes, and Posner’s research on lower federal courts 
may reconcile Justice Sotomayor’s tough-on-crime rulings as a lower 
federal judge with her pro-defendant rulings as a Supreme Court 
Justice. They find that court of appeals judges who desire promotion 
to the Supreme Court “audition” for the Court by altering their voting 
behavior to appear desirable for the position.54 Being “tough on 
crime” increases the odds of being promoted to the Court, and as 
such, auditioners tend to be harsher on defendants than non-
auditioners.55 Auditioners in the Court’s promotion pool share certain 
characteristics, and unsurprisingly, Justice Sotomayor had many of 
these characteristics at the time of her nomination: she was fifty-four 
years old, non-white and female, a graduate of Yale Law School, a 
Second Circuit judge, and rated “well qualified” by the American Bar 
Association.56 Justice Sotomayor’s characteristics as a district court 
judge also qualified her as an auditioner for the court of appeals. 
These characteristics coupled with Justice Sotomayor’s “tough on 
crime” voting record while on the Southern District of New York and 
the Second Circuit corroborate the likelihood that she was an 
auditioner for the Supreme Court. Indeed, the commentators find that 
Justice Sotomayor had one of the highest probabilities of being in the 
Court’s “promotion pool.”57  
As early as 1991, rumors circulated that Justice Sotomayor could 
be a viable prospect for the Supreme Court,58 and although she was 
unanimously confirmed to the Southern District of New York, 
Republicans attempted to block her nomination to the Second Circuit 
in 1997 because they feared that she was on a “rocket ship” to the 
 
TRAC REPORTS (July 8, 2009), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/judge/213. 
 53  MAJORITY STAFF OF THE S. JUDICIARY COMM., SONIA SOTOMAYOR: THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE RECORD, U.S. SENATE 1362 (2010), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CHRG-
SOTOMAYOR/pdf/GPO-CHRG-SOTOMAYOR-2-6-124.pdf. 
 54  EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 13, at 362, 363 tbl.8.8. 
 55  Id. at 262. 
 56  Id. at 343, 350–52, 355. 
 57  Id. at 357. 
 58  MEG GREENE, SONIA SOTOMAYOR: A BIOGRAPHY 105 (2012). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
Document7  12/17/17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 54:19 
 
 
Supreme Court.59 Her background put her neatly into the promotion 
pool, so she had every incentive to improve her chances of being 
appointed to the Supreme Court.60 Part of her strategy may have been 
being tough on crime, and even if this theory lacks merit, we know 
that her tough-on-crime record was “immensely helpful in softening 
Republican fears” during her Supreme Court confirmation hearings.61 
Upon elevation to the Supreme Court, Justice Sotomayor began 
voting liberally in criminal procedure cases. Within her first term on 
the Court, Justice Sotomayor immediately started voting in favor of 
criminal defendants—even when unaccompanied by her liberal 
colleagues—which could indicate that her promotion to the Supreme 
Court freed her from ambitions for a higher office and enabled her to 
exhibit her sincerely held liberal views.62 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court is currently in a period of flux. The passing of 
Justice Scalia and the confirmation of Justice Neil Gorsuch may have 
particular significance for criminal defendants. Prior to his 
confirmation, some commentators looked to Justice Gorsuch’s 
rulings on the Tenth Circuit to predict that he would follow in Justice 
Scalia’s footsteps in criminal procedure cases.63 However, Justice 
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 60  EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 13, at 349. 
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Gorsuch’s record on the Tenth Circuit may not accurately represent 
his criminal procedure voting tendencies. If Justice Gorsuch fails to 
align with Justice Scalia’s pro-defendant tendencies, he could 
potentially move the Court to the right on criminal justice issues. 
Though our results indicate that pre-confirmation predictions may 
have very little predictive power in criminal procedure cases, the 
voting behavior of Justices Scalia and Sotomayor identified in this 
Article certainly informs predictions about the Court moving 
forward.  
With Justice Scalia’s recent passing, we consider his legacy. 
Justice Scalia has certainly fulfilled President Reagan’s ideological 
goals in a range of issues from abortion to the Second Amendment.64 
Republicans have praised him as an ideal Justice and model for 
Supreme Court appointments65 but would his votes for criminal 
defendants have made President Reagan proud? The once “darling of 
tough-on-crime conservatives”66 ultimately considered himself “the 
darling of the criminal defense bar.”67 Since his passing, both 
conservatives68 and liberals69 have reflected on his liberal criminal 
procedure jurisprudence in memoriam. It is unlikely that President 
Reagan would have been pleased with Justice Scalia’s expansion of 
defendants’ rights in Fourth and Sixth Amendment cases, but given 
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 66  Bibas, supra note 24, at 184. 
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the sea change in criminal justice reform,70 conservatives and liberals 
alike may praise him for this jurisprudence for years to come.  
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